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Rational choice is the law's predominate model.' The law believes
that (1) clients are rational, and (2) they will act rationally by choosing
the path that leads to maximum utility, and (3) lawyers act profession-
ally when they base their professional behavior on these assumptions.
Clients need the information that will allow them (or their lawyer) to
calculate the costs and benefits of each decision. In essence, law
transplants the assumptions of classical economics into the realm of
lawyer-client decision making.'
Recent research casts doubt on the rational choice model of
decision making. This research shows that not all people make decisions
by carefully listing options and thoroughly discussing them.3 Real
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Distinguished Professor ofLaw and
Public Policy, University ofArkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law.
1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONONIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998)
(noting humans are rational maximizers ofends in life); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060 (2000) (noting rationality at heart of modem
economic theory). See generally Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise,
Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 324 (1995) ("Our
legal education system is predicated on unstated and generally unexamined
assumptions about what lawyers do. For each of us, including lawyers and law
professors, the concept of 'lawyer' draws upon a prototypical lawyer engaged in a
prototypically lawyerly endeavor.").
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology ofLitigation, 70
S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 114-15 (1996) (suggesting that economics is the dominant model
for studying litigation and settlement behavior); Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest:
Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997
Wis. L. REV. 475, 475 (stating that "[m]uch of the sociology of law (like much of social
science in general) rests on certain implicit or explicit assumptions about how people
make decisions . . . [,]" one of which is an economic or instrumental approach that
assumes compliance with law is a calculated assessment of costs and benefits). Law
and Economics as a movement is not concerned with the techniques of legal
interviewing. Rather, it concerns itself with "how actors in and subject to the legal
system respond to legal directives." Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1055.
Nevertheless, the idea that clients would make decisions based on a rational framework
and that these decisions would be based on maximizing client self-interest have
permeated the legal interviewing and counseling literature. Id.
3. See generally IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1978); see also
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1057 (describing the "anomalies" researchers have
discovered about rational choice theory and proposing a new movement called "Law
and Behavioral Science" that will take into account the insights of both rational choice
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people use perceptual shortcuts, cognitive end runs, and "irrational"
factors to make important and not so important decisions.4 The rational
choice model does not give an accurate picture of how actual clients
make litigation decisions.' One commentator notes that "[c]urrent
theories of litigation fail to account for the possibility that litigants'
decision making under risk and uncertainty may not comport with
rational theories of behavior, and they therefore fail to paint a complete
picture of litigation.'"
Incorporating these insights can improve legal counseling. The
insights of one theory, known as "prospect theory," has proven
particularly useful in explaining lawyer and client decision making.
Prospect theory shows that the decision a person makes will be greatly
influenced by the way he frames his options. At the same time, however,
the presence of lawyers seems to mitigate the effect of these frames.
This article builds on these findings to suggest that legal counseling7
theory and its critics).
4. RICHARD NIsBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGEMENT (1980); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCi. 1124 (1974); see also Chris
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (reporting results of empirical study showing that
cognitive illusions had significant impact on judicial decision making); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation, 79 OR. L. REV.
61 (2000) (showing a pattern of judicial ignorance of or adaptation to cognitive
illusions); W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30
J. LEG. STUD. 107 (2001) (containing study showing cognitive illusions influencing
jurors' decisions).
5. Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 116.
6. Id. at 114. But see Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (noting rational choice theory is morally and
empirically superior to behavioral economics); Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in
Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the
Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 330-31 (1986) (stating that the
difference that rational choice critics found is the difference between "the real and the
ideal").
7. Legal Counseling closely resembles "Decision Counseling." See IRVING L.
JANIS, SHORTTERM COUNSELING (1983). This short-term counseling seeks to be effective
"in just a few sessions with clients who seek help when they are making vital decisions
concerning their health, career, marriage, or other aspects of their personal lives."
Irving L. Janis, Problems of Short-Term Counseling, in COUNSELING PERSONAL DECISIONS
3 (Irving L. Janis ed., 1979). For an approach to legal counseling based on a decision
counselor model, see ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., JOHN M.A. DIIPPA, & MARTHA M.
PETERS, THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING 109-13 (1999); see also Suchman, supra note 2, at 495-96. That author
stated:
Moral sentiments, one might argue, can simply be assimilated into people's
utility functions, alongside more conventionally self-serving motives. Thus,
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should be less ideological and more pragmatic.8 Effective legal
counselors should be aware of their own and their client's cognitive
obstacles to fully rational decision making. Once aware, they should
adjust their approaches to counter these obstacles.9
II. AN OVERVIEW OF DECISION THEORY:
THE DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE APPROACHES
There are two approaches to studying decision-making: 0
Normative (The way it should be)
Descriptive (The way it is)
The normative approach is the classic way to look at decision making.
It studies the process of decision making to detect flaws that prevent
people from making the best decision under the circumstances." It
makes several assumptions that parallel the assumptions of classical
economics:
(1) Humans are rational,
we make rational decisions based not only on material costs and benefits, but
also on an assessment of how particular lines of action will affect our social
interactions with others and our psychological interactions with ourselves.
Id.; see also COCHRAN, DIPIPPA, & PETERS, supra, at 146-50 (outlining a decision process
that explicitly considers the consequences to other people, to the client's self-image,
and to the client's reputation).
There has, however, been a recent movement toward "Therapeutic
Jurisprudence." DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE WImCK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (1991); DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEutnC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); Susan Daicoff, Making Law Therapeutic for Lawyers:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and the Psychology ofLawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 811 (1999); Marc W. Patry, David B. Wexler, Dennis P. Stolle, & Alan J.
Tompkins, Better Legal Counseling Through Empirical Research: Identifying Psycholegal Soft
Spots and Strategies, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 439 (1998); Dennis B. Stolle et al., Integrating
Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to
Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15 (1997).
8. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1073. Korobkin and Ulen identify this
approach as related to legal pragmatism. That is, it "consciously chooses to emphasize
its external usefulness in analyzing legal problems rather than either its internal
elegance or universal applicability." Id. at 1057-58.
9. See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil
Settlements, 4 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (1999); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L.
REV. 77 (1997); Richard W. Painter, Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a Closing in Arthur
Solmssen's The Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAm L. REV. 1111 (2000).
10. See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 3-5
(3d ed. 1994).
11. JANIS& MANN, supra note 3, at 11-12.
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(2) Humans act to maximize their interests, and
(3) The best decision maximizes the decision maker's interests under the
circumstances. 2
These assumptions dictate a decision process of listing, evaluating, and
choosing. 3 People are advised to make a list of the available options, to
evaluate each option by measuring the gain and loss if that option is
pursued, and to choose the option that results in the most gain or the
least loss.' 4 Most people are familiar with this process from the ordinary
method of drawing a line down the middle of the page and listing the
"pros" of the decision on one side and the "cons" of the decision on the
other. "
Classical economics assumes that, given accurate information in
sufficient quantities, each person will make the same decision. The
classical approach assumes not only that people are rational and that
they will follow a rational process, but also that they will have unbiased
information available to them on which to base their decisions. People
will always choose the option that maximizes their gains or minimizes
their losses. Any deviations from this norm are explained either by
showing that the decision maker did not have sufficient information by
which to calculate her best option or that the decision maker's thinking
was faulty.
These assumptions work well at general levels. For example, they
seem to explain macroeconomic behavior, i.e, behavior on the largest
scale. They allow economists to create models of the national economy
on which to base large-scale economic policy.
Studies in the fields of social psychology and economics have
called each of these assumptions into question. 6 These findings argue
12. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
13. See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 10, at 3-4; JANIS & MANN, supra note 3, at 11.
14. JANIS & MANN, supra note 3, at 11. The authors list the following components
of optimal decisionmaking: consider a large number of factors; the goal is to consider
as many as possible; generate as many alternatives as possible; delay decision in favor
of more alternatives; test best alternatives repeatedly, arranging them in multiple ways
to allow comparative judgements; take account of magnitude of all the pros and cons;
look for tradeoffs between high values on some and low values on others. Id
15. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 307 (1991).
16. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1478 (1998) ("[E]xpected utility theory
is not a good description of actual decisionmaking."); Cass R Sunstein, How Law
Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637, 2637 (1998) (observing that normative
account of rational choice lacks "descriptive accuracy").
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that the normative approach and classical economics fail to provide an
accurate picture of how people actually make decisions. These theorists
argue that a more effective approach would be to study and describe
actual human decision making. 7
III. AN OUTLINE OF THE DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH
People make decisions all the time, but for most of these decisions,
they have neither the time nor the resources to engage in an optimal
search and evaluation process.'8 Research shows that people have
developed cognitive shortcuts to make ordinary decisions easier. 9 These
cognitive shortcuts or schemas are essential to daily life.2" People could
not function efficiently if every decision required complete analysis, no
matter how often they may have faced the same choice in the past or
how inconsequential the decision may be.2
Even when confronted with important decisions and given
sufficient information, people still rely on these shortcuts.2 People may
have a limit to the amount of information that they can process at any
one time.3 This limits their ability to discover and process information
17. Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 16, at 1476 (stating that task of behavioral
economics is to study actual human behavior and its implications for law); Sunstein,
supra note 16, at 2637. Although real people depart from rational choice model, their
decision making is not "unpredictable, systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or
elusive to social scientists." Id. Rather, their departures can be "described, used and
sometimes even modeled." Id.
18. JANIS & MANN, supra note 3, at 22; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 16, at
1471; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1077-78 (stating that the decision to use a
simple decision process "might be sensible given the marginal benefits and costs of
making an optimal decision relative to a satisfactory one; in other words, the decision
not to maximize utility when solving a single problem might in fact maximize the
actor's overall utility"); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral
Inquiry into Lawyer's Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 99 (1993)
("Attorneys are confronted with immense amounts of intellectual stimuli each day and
must implicitly or explicitly make thousands of decisions and judgements through
inductive reasoning.").
19. NIsBETr & Ross, supra note 4, at 7.
20. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1076 (observing that without cognitive
shortcuts, "the task of making even relatively simple decisions would become so
complex that daily life would almost certainly grind to a halt"); Langevoort, supra note
18, at 99 (noting that without cognitive shortcuts, "life would be unbearably chaotic").
21. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 4, at 7; Langevoort, supra note 18, at 99-100
(noting cognitive shortcuts work well in everyday life because they are "curiously
finctional" and more precise mechanisms are not practical).
22. JANIS & MANN, supra note 3, at 22-25.
23. ROBIN M. HOGARTH, JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION 4
(2d ed. 1987); see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1078 (noting complexity of
2001]
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and to project future consequences from that information.24 Decision
theorists call this "bounded rationality.
25
A person very often will simplify the decision process by using the
"just good enough" criteria to seize upon the first alternative that
satisfies this simplified criteria. This is called "satisficing. 26 When
coupled with other psychological processes, people can make decisions
that may appear "irrational" when judged by the normative or classical
view." Satisficing is an especially common strategy when people make
complex decisions under stress.28
Satisficing seems to involve the use of cognitive shortcuts known
as "heuristics" or "schemas. ' 2' These are easy-to-use templates that
allow people to make ordinary decisions. They "produce vastly more
correct or partially correct inferences than erroneous ones, and they do
so with great speed and little effort." These heuristics allow people to
learn from their experiences and to make consistent decisions over
decision leads to systematic departures from rational model).
24. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1085 (stating that use of cognitive shortcuts
causes people to be "systematically biased in their predictions of the probable results
of various events").
25. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957). Simon describes
bounded rationality in this way: "The capacity of the human mind for formulating and
solving complex problems is very small compared to with the size of the problems
whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world-or even
for a reasonable for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality." Id. at
198; see also Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 16, at 1477 (noting that bounded
rationality describes the systematic ways that people try to cope with their "limited
computational skills and seriously flawed memories").
26. SIMON, supra note 25, at 204-05.
27. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1085 ("[W]hether or not the well-
documented collection of heuristics and biases are rational adaptations in a global
sense, they have the consequence of causing actors to make decisions that violate the
predictions of rational choice theory in individual circumstances.").
28. JANIS & MANN, supra note 3, at 51; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1077
("Complexity beyond human cognitive capacity is a sufficient condition for an actor
to substitute a simplified decision strategy ... but it is not a necessary condition.").
This may also be a result of too many choices. See Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R.
Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000) (noting subjects suffering from choice
overload are less satisfied with choice and less motivated to engage in the full decision
process).
29. NISBET" & Ross, supra note 4, at 17-42; see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note
1, at 1076 (noting that bounded rationality is the "unintentional consequence of an
unconscious use of heuristics in judgment and decision-making tasks."); Rachlinski,
supra note 4, at 61 (observing that human brain has a limited ability to process
information and uses shortcuts that allow it to perform most tasks well).
30. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 4, at 18.
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time.3' They save time and resources by preventing duplication of effort,
by keeping recent decisions in the foreground, and by providing an
objective reference point against which to measure decisions.32
Social psychologists and decision theorists have identified a
number of these cognitive shortcuts." The one that has gotten the most
attention in the legal literature is the "anchoring and adjustment
heuristic." This model shows that people tend to anchor decisions to
some initial reference point.' That is, people need baselines against
which they can evaluate their choices or from which they can make
initial estimates.35 They then adopt revisions to their position in light of
this reference point.3 6
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id. The authors note:
Few, if any, stimuli are approached for the first time by the adult. Instead,
they are processed through preexisting systems of schematized and
abstracted knowledge--beliefs, theories, propositions, and schemas. These
knowledge structures label and categorize objects and events quickly and, for
the most part, accurately. They also define a set ofexpectations about objects
and events and suggest appropriate responses to them.
Id
33. Besides anchoring and adjustment, social scientists have identified the
following:
Availability Heuristic: Making judgements based on recently available
information.
Representativeness Heuristic: Relying on the similarity of current objects or
events to past objects or events. That is, expecting a current event that is
similar to a past event to have the same qualities as the past event.
Illusory Correlations and Causation Biases: Finding causal patterns and
relationships in matters that are randomly produced.
FundamentalAttribution Bias: Overestimating the influence ofpersonal factors
in explaining another's behavior while underestimating the influence of
personal factors in explaining one's own behavior.
Biases in Risk Perceptions: Ignoring low probability risks.
The Hindsight Bias: Overestimating the extent to which a person could have
predicted some future event once they learn what actually happened.
Intertermporal Biases: Discounting future risks and rewards more heavily.
Egocentric Biases: Engaging in self-serving explanations.
False Consensus Effect: Overestimating the extent to which people share the
same attitudes and beliefs.
See BAZERMAN, supra note 10, at 7-9; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv.
1499 (1998).
34. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 4, at 41; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at
1128.




Prospect theory is a particular application of the anchoring and
adjustment heuristic." It holds that people tend to weigh losses more
heavily than gains. Accordingly, they will be more willing to assume
risk when facing the loss of something they have than when potentially
gaining something they do not have.3" Thus, prospect theory suggests
that whether decisions are framed in terms of gains or losses will affect
the way decisions are made even though the status quo may be
completely arbitrary and manipulable.39
The pioneering work in this field was done by Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman.4 ° Through a series of experiments, they showed that
the normative model did not accurately describe how people actually
make decisions.4 The deviations from the normative model are "too
widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random
error, and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the
normative system." 2
Prospect theory has two phases: "framing/editing" and "eval-
uation."'4 A person conducts a preliminary analysis of the decision
problem. This preliminary analysis frames the rest of the process. It may
control the manner in which the choice is presented as well as what the
decision maker expects from the decision. It may also influence the
amount and the kind of information produced to evaluate the decision."
In the evaluation phase, the decision maker seeks the highest value
among the prospective alternatives.45 When one option predominates,
37. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1104 (noting that prospect theory
incorporates empirical findings about decision making under uncertainty that
contradicts rational choice models).
38. Id. at 1104-05.
39. Id. (noting that choices do not necessarily depend on the absolute values of
items but rather on the direction in which the items deviate from a fluid and easily
manipulated baseline).
40. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12, at 263.
41. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, 59 J. Bus. 251, 251-52 (1986). What makes this claim striking is that logic
suggests that people should prefer a rational model:
* People are effective in pursuing their goals, especially when they have
significant monetary or reputational incentives and can learn from
their experience; and
* Competition should favor rational individuals and organizations
because those groups who make the best (i.e., the most optimal)
decisions should survive in a competitive environment.
Id.
42. Id. at 252.
43. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12, at 274.
44. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 257.
45. Id.
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decision makers tend to use the conventional, rational process.46 When
one choice does not stand out, the decision maker must make a decision
based on the relative values of the available choices.47 Options do not
exist in a vacuum, however. Unless there is some objective reference
point that will govern the choice, the outcomes will be measured from
a neutral reference point. Choosing the reference point provides the
frame in which the alternatives are evaluated.48
Tversky and Kahneman showed that a decision maker's response
to loss is greater than the response to gains.49 For example, people will
charge more to part with an item than they will pay for it." Defying the
assumptions of conventional economic theory, selling an already paid-
for item is perceived as a loss while purchasing a new item is seen as a
gain.5
Whether or not a person perceives his choices as losses or gains
influences or frames his willingness to take risks. 2 Tversky and
Kahneman's experiments showed that decision makers are risk-averse
in gain frames and risk-seeking in loss frames. 3 That is, people are more
46. Dominance happens when "one option is better than another in one state and
at least as good in all other states." Id. at 253.
47. Id. at 272.
48. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12, at 274.
49. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 258. This effect is exaggerated even
more by the different subjective value people assign to essentially the same loss. For
example, the difference in value between a gain of $100 and $200 is perceived as
greater than the difference between a gain of $1100 and $1200. Id. Even though the
actual amount of the gain is the same in both instances, a person's subjective perception
of the value is different. The same is true for losses. The difference between a $100 and
a $200 loss is seen as greater than the difference between an $1100 and a $1200 loss.
Id. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 2646 (noting that people are roughly twice as
displeased with losses).
50. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 258.
51. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1107-08. Rational choice theory predicts
that "[w]hether [a person] owns the loaf of bread, the glass of wine, or neither, should
make no difference as to which item he would prefer. [H]owever,... individuals often
place a higher monetary value on items they own than on those that they do not own."
Id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 16, at 2646 ("Contrary to economic theory, people do
not treat out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs as if they were equivalent.").
52. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 259. "[IThe effective carriers of values
are gains and losses, or changes in wealth, rather than states of wealth as implied by the
rational model." This may be due to our basic psychological makeup. The authors note:
Our perceptual apparatus is attuned to the evaluation of changes or
differences rather than to the evaluation of absolute magnitudes. When we
respond to attributes such as brightness, loudness, or temperature, the past
and present context of experience defines an adaptation level, or reference
point, and stimuli are perceived in relation to this reference point.
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12, at 277.
53. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 258.
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likely to "play it safe" to retain a perceived "gain" but are more likely
to take risks when they might suffer a perceived "loss. 5 4 Which frame
a person uses depends on a number of contextual factors but the status
quo is frequently the initial reference point and the frames are fluid and
easily manipulated."
IV. USING PROSPECT THEORY TO EXPLAIN
LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT BEHAVIOR
Legal scholars have used prospect theory to explain the litigation
behavior of lawyers and clients.56 A growing number of legal scholars
are using prospect theory to provide a more accurate explanation of how
litigation decisions are made. In addition, other scholars are using
prospect theory to explain and predict the behavior of transactional
lawyers.
Prospect theory predicts that plaintiffs and defendants will frame
litigation decisions in different ways." In general, plaintiffs are more
likely to frame settlement offers as choices among gains while defen-
54. See Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205
(2001) (critiquing current employment law rules as based on an inadequate sense of
workers' actual values and behavior because, among other things, workers, like all
people, are especially averse to loss).
55. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 2647.
Whether an event "codes" as a loss or a gain depends on a range of
contextual factors, including how the event is framed. The status quo is
usually the reference point, so that losses are understood as such by reference
to existing distributions and practices; but it is possible to manipulate the
frame so as to make a change code a loss rather than a gain, or vice-versa.
Id.
56. This is part of a larger movement to bring the findings of cognitive psychology
and behavioral economics to bear on legal analysis. Frank B. Cross, In Praise of
Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2000) (using social psychology to study
settlement behavior of plaintiffs); Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, supra note 4, at 777
(studying the effects of cognitive illusions on judges); Paul Slovic, RationalActors and
Rational Fools: The Influence of Affect on Judgment and Decision-Making, 6 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 166 (2000) (noting automatic, experiential, and affect-based
factors as important as rational/analytic factors); Suchman, supra note 2, at 475
(outlining three leading perspectives on decisionmaking and their implications for the
social scientific study of law); see also Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 16, at 1473
(observing that law-and-economics has resisted insights of behavioral analysis and
advancing an approach to the "economic analysis of law that is informed by a more
accurate conception of choice, one that reflects a better understanding of human
behavior and its wellsprings"); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1057 (incorporating
findings of behavioral science builds on core law-and-economics insights).
57. Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 119-20.
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dants are more likely to frame the same offers as choices among losses."
Prospect theory predicts that in these circumstances plaintiffs would be
more risk-averse and thus look to settle, while defendants would be
more risk-seeking and choose trial."
Prospect theory predicts that the degree of probability will also help
frame the choices. It holds that people will be risk-averse when
choosing among moderate-to-high probability gains and when choosing
among low-probability losses."° Conversely, people will be risk-seeking
when choosing among moderate-to-high probability losses and low
probability gains.6 In addition, few litigation decisions involve single
factors that can easily be characterized clearly as a "gain" or as a "loss."
Plaintiffs, for example, might be concerned with non-monetary aspects
of litigation; the different parties might not agree on the chances of the
plaintiff wining the case in court; and so on.62
In addition, the frame a person chooses is influenced by "the
manner in which the choice problem is presented as well as by [the]
norms, habits, and expectancies of the decision maker."' 3 At the same
time, the economics of lawyer-client decision making may not be
subject to the most extreme framing influences." Tversky and
58. Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI.
L. REv. 163, 168 (2000). Guthrie points out that Robin M. Hogarth made this
connection in the late 1980s. Id. at 167 n.16; see HOGARTH, supra note 23, at 105.
59. Rachlinksi, supra note 2, at 113, 119-20; see also Linda Babcock et al., Forming
Beliefs AboutAdjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions ofRisk and Reservation of Values, 15 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 289 (1995) (finding that risk aversion depended on whether subjects
played role of defendant or plaintiff).
60. Guthrie, supra note 58, at 166-67.
61. Id.
62. HOGARTH, supra note 23, at 105; see Suchman, supra note 2, at 495-96.
Moral sentiments, one might argue, can simply be assimilated into people's
utility functions, alongside more conventionally self-serving motives. Thus,
we make rational decisions based not only on material costs and benefits, but
also on an assessment of how particular lines of actions will affect our social
interactions with others and our psychological interactions with ourselves.
Id; see also COCHRAN, DIPIPPA, & PETERS, supra note 7, at 146-50 (outlining a decision
process that explicitly considers the consequences to other people, to the client's self-
image, and to the client's reputation).
63. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 257.
64. Lawyers are paid for their work. The quality of their advice enhances their
reputations and, in turn, leads to more legal work from the same or similar clients.
Donald Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in
Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 397 (1997). Moreover, there is
considerable competition among law firms. Clients can "shop around" for firms that
will produce the best results. Id. at 399-400 (describing the "beauty contest" process
where a client shows a project to different law firms to see how each would handle the
matter). Conversely, clients, especially institutional clients, may drop a law firm that
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Kahneman summarize this point by saying: "[I]ncentives sometimes
improve the quality of decisions, experienced decision makers often do
better than novices, and the forces of arbitrage and competition can
nullify some effects of error and illusion.""
Although these factors may mitigate some of prospect theory's
influence on legal decisions, studies in other disciplines show that errors
persist even in the face of significant monetary incentives.66 Incentives
help focus attention and thus may be most influential when the decision
problem results from a lack of attention." Many poor decisions result
from misperceptions of the underlying facts or of the relative risks
inherent in the alternatives, however.'8 In other words, paying a lawyer
may not avert cognitive error if both lawyer and client misperceive the
underlying level of risk. Moreover, cognitive errors persist even with
learning. Learning requires feedback and many decisions do not lend
themselves to feedback or are self-fulfilling.69 This is especially true in
legal counseling when many decisions cannot be revised after assessing
the consequences or are not subject to accurate assessment. For
example, the decision to settle a case before trial cannot be accurately
evaluated because neither party will have the outcome of a trial to use
as a benchmark. Thus, prospect theory can provide valuable insights
even for well-paid, highly-respected, and experienced lawyers.
Lawyers who understand prospect theory and incorporate it into
their counseling styles can gain an advantage over other lawyers.
Plaintiffs and defendants may view the problem from generally different
viewpoints with consequent different assessments of risk." Knowing
leads them to a bad decision. Thus, lawyers have economic and non-economic
incentives to help clients make the most optimal decision possible. Korobkin &
Guthrie, supra note 9 at 123-24 (describing how both psychological and financial
factors influence the lawyer's role). Finally, lawyers are repeat players in the legal
system. They develop considerable experience in substantive law and in how the
system works that gives them substantive and procedural advantages. Cross, supra note
56, at 4. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).
65. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 273.
66. See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 10, at 5; JANIS & MANN, supra note 4, at 23-34;
see also JANIS & MANN, supra note 3, at 107-34 (detailing the flawed decision process
on a major policy question in the Nixon administration).
67. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 274.
68. See discussion supra Part III.
69. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 274; see also Langevoort &
Rasmussen, supra note 64, at 377-78 (discussing the difficulties clients have if they
want to monitor or evaluate their lawyer's advice).
70. HOGARTH, supra note 23, at 105.
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how this might influence risk assessments could lead to a competitive
advantage for one side."
V. How FRAMING INFLUENCES SETTLEMENT BEHAVIOR
Professors Chris Guthrie and Russell Korobkin demonstrated that
framing had a more significant effect on settlement behavior than other
psychological variables." As they put it:
Our results make it clear that frames matter in legal dispute resolu-
tion. Disputants may reject a settlement offer economically sufficient
to produce a negotiated settlement if they view it in relation to a
reference point that suggests accepting the offer would mean
accepting a net loss on the transaction. Conversely, an adverse party
might perceive an offer framed in its best light as favorable, even if
she would reject a frameless presentation of the same substance.'
They predicted psychological barriers would prevent litigants from
acting according to the dictates of rational choice theory:
Psychological barriers, which are cognitive and perceptual in nature,
prevent disputants from acting in a value-maximizing, utilitarian
manner .... Our general conclusion is that these psychological
constructs can cause legal disputes to go to trial even when there is a
viable bargaining range and no strategic behavior by the disputants.74
71. Id. Moreover, understanding the effects of framing on litigation choices could
lead to a clearer and, ultimately, more successful approach to reform of lawyer codes
of conduct, legal training, and litigation practices. Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note
16, at 1474 (noting that behavioral economics help explain law's effects, describe how
law can be used to achieve desirable social goals, and assess the goals of the legal
system); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1056 (noting that behavioral economics
makes law and economics more relevant to the making of social policy); Rachlinski,
supra note 2, at 121; see also Birke & Fox, supra note 9, at 1; Paul Brest & Linda
Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgement, 69 WASH. L. REv. 527 (1994); Korobkin
& Guthrie, supra note 9, at 77; Painter, supra note 9, at 1111.
72. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement:AnExperimentalApproach, 93 MICH.L. REV. 107 (1994). Framing effects were
tested against (1) equity seeking--the tendency of individuals to seek to correct the
relational imbalance brought about by an offense against them, and (2) reactive
devaluation-the tendency of an individual to discount an offer made by an adversary.
Id. at 143-44, 151-52.
73. Id. at 137.
74. Id. at 117. "Strategic behavior" refers to the strategic bargaining model of
settlement. Id. at 114. This theory assumes that bargaining failures are caused by
miscalculations. Id. at 116. The negotiating parties agree that settling out of court would
be advantageous; they simply cannot agree on how to divide up the settlement pie. Id.
at 114-15. Each is aiming to get the most they can from out of the settlement, but each
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Their results showed that how litigants framed offers influenced
their likelihood to settle more than their perception of the other party."
Offers framed as losses would encourage risk-seeking behavior while
offers framed as gains would encourage risk-averse behavior. That is,
people avoid risk when they choose between options they understand as
gains, but they prefer risk when they choose between options viewed as
losses.76
A study by Professor Jeffrey J. Rachlinski showed that framing
causes plaintiffs and defendants to view the same offer in different
ways.77 He conducted three controlled studies in which he presented first
year law students a litigation scenario and then asked them whether or
not they would accept a certain settlement offer." He told some of the
students that they were defendants and he told other students that they
were plaintiffs. He put the offers in gain and loss frames.79 In one case,
the frame suggested that the choices all involved losses while the other
frame suggested that the choices involved gains. His subjects typically
made risk-seeking choices in the loss frame and risk-averse choices in
the gain frame. Plaintiff-subjects consistently chose settlement while the
defendant-subjects consistently chose trial.Ws
He concluded that "the role of the plaintiff or defendant in litigation
influences the attractiveness of a settlement offer in a way that is
consistent with framing theory. Plaintiffs prefer sure, riskless settle-
ments more than defendants."'" In addition, far more of the loss frame
defendants choose the riskier course of action than the gain frame
defendants. 2
is handicapped by limited information, resources, and time. Thus, they must guess at
what the other side will accept and, in the process, may miscalculate. Id. at 116.
75. Id at 139-40.
76. Id at 142. They note that "[tihe framing experiments illustrate that people use
a reference point to code options as gains or losses and that this coding systematically
influences settlement behavior. The anchoring experiment demonstrates that an
opponent's opening offer may unduly influence people's expectations and, hence, their
decisions about whether to settle." Id; see also Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way,
10 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 4-5 (1994) (showing that parties who made extreme
opening offers were more likely to get higher settlements than parties who made more
moderate opening offers).
77. Rachlinksi, supra note 2, at 135.
78. Id. at 135-36.
79. Id. at 136.
80. Id. at 137; see also Babcock et al., supra note 59, at 289 (showing that role
influenced how subjects framed choice).
81. Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 140.
82. Id at 142. They were also willing to sacrifice ethics in the loss frame. Id
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Rachlinski argues that the structure of litigation places defendants
in loss frames and plaintiffs in gain frames. Thus, defendants are more
likely to pursue risk-seeking options-refusing early settlement or
taking a chance at trial-while plaintiffs are more likely to pursue risk-
averse choices-seeking settlement in lieu of trial or for less than the
desirable amount.8 3
Guthrie and co-author Russel Korobkin observed how framing
influenced the eventual amount of a settlement.8" They set out to test a
conventional assumption: negotiators who began with an extreme offer
were less likely to reach settlement. The normative model predicted this
outcome because the extreme offer would make subsequent concessions
and compromise difficult." They found, instead, that negotiators who
began with a moderate offer were less likely to reach settlement.8 This
is because "a litigant who opens a negotiation with a moderate settle-
ment offer inadvertently erects psychological barriers-namely,
anchoring and adjustment effects and dissonance avoidance-that




The rational choice model of settlement behavior cannot persua-
sively explain these results.88 The rational choice model suggests that an
extreme initial offer would alienate the other party.
[A] rational plaintiff should determine whether a settlement offer or
trial has a higher risk-adjusted present value and select accordingly.
The fact that a defendant previously made a moderate opening offer,
rather than an extreme opening offer or no offer at all, should not
systematically influence plaintiffs' responses to the final settlement
offer.' 9
83. Rachlinski does not doubt that people seek the best possible outcome. Rather,
he argues that people may be hindered in their ability to identity the best outcome. Id.
at 118. Cognitive factors influence their ability to accurately evaluate available
information. Id These are not character flaws. That is, this inability does not stem from
a lack of effort or motivation. Rather, "the structure of many choices lures people into
making decisions that are suboptimal, from the perspective of a rational model." Id
84. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 76, at 1, 4-5.
85. Id at 4.
86. Id at 5.
87. Id
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id. at 17.
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The authors argue that prospect theory explains these results." Initial
offers may anchor the opposing side's expectations. Subsequent offers
are measured by their distance from the initial anchor. The distance
from an extreme initial offer to a final moderate settlement is greater
than the distance from a moderate opening to a final moderate offer. The
first settlement will appear more substantial because the other side has
"lost" more or the plaintiff will have "gained" more than the second
settlement scenario.9'
The foregoing indicates that framing has a powerful effect on
clients' litigation decisions. It has more impact than other psychological
forces, it causes plaintiffs and defendants to tolerate levels of risk, and
it influences the size of the eventual settlement. Framing also seems to
play a role when people decide to sue and whether they are willing to
pursue long-shot lawsuits.
VI. How FRAMING INFLUENCES THE DECISION TO SUE
Prospect theory predicts that plaintiffs will be risk-averse when
considering settlement while defendants will be risk-seeking. Plaintiffs
must decide to file a lawsuit in the first place, however. Plaintiffs make
a decision to sue within a frame in the same way that they must make
90. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 76, at 18. Besides the anchoring and
adjustment heuristic, the authors also suggest that cognitive dissonance plays a role in
this context. Their study showed that plaintiffs who had earlier rejected a moderate
settlement were reluctant to later accept it. Id. at 20-21. They believe this results from
an effort to avoid cognitive dissonance. Accepting an offer that the party earlier
rejected creates cognitive dissonance: the person has to explain to herself why she now
accepts the offer. Because dissonance is a negative state, people are motivated to avoid
it. Thus, either the litigant will reject the offer or make an effort to rationalize how the
offer or the conditions are different now. Id. at 20. In any event, this bolsters the
anchoring effect of the initial offer. Since the parties are most likely to settle within the
hypothetical bargaining range-the range where the two parties' realistic expectations
overlap--an opening moderate offer will be closer to that range than an opening
extreme offer. Once a party rejects the opening moderate offer, it will be difficult to
overcome the cognitive dissonance created from accepting the same or a reasonably
final offer. Id. at 20-21.
91. Id at 19. The authors noted:
Subjects in Group A, who received the extreme initial offer of $2,000,
expected to settle for a relatively small amount, so the final offer of $12,000
appeared generous. Subjects in Group B, who received a moderate initial
offer of $10,000, expected to settle for a relatively large sum, so the final
offer of $12,000 did not appear as favorable by comparison. The moderate
opening offer apparently anchored subjects' expectations in a way that
tended to discourage settlement.
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decisions about settlement. Whether or not that choice is framed as a
gain or a loss will make the plaintiff more or less risk-seeking. Risk-
averse plaintiffs may avoid lawsuits while risk seeking plaintiffs may
more eagerly pursue lawsuits.
Professor Chris Guthrie suggests that framing may influence the
filing of frivolous lawsuits.92 Guthrie's hypothesis is that the decision
frame in early litigation decisions induces risk-seeking behavior in some
plaintiffs and risk-averse behavior in some defendants.93 He suggests
that whether or not a person will be risk-averse or risk-seeking depends
not only on perceived gains and losses, but also on the probability that
the gain or loss will occur." Thus,
[i]ndividuals are likely to underweight moderate-to-high-probabili-
ties, which enhances risk aversion for moderate-to-high probability
gains and risk seeking for moderate-to-high probability losses.
Individuals are likely to overweight low probabilities, which induces
risk seeking for low-probability gains and risk aversion for low-
probability losses.9"
A long-shot lawsuit, which may or may not be "legally" frivolous,
can be seen as a low-probability gain." At the outset, these plaintiffs see
litigation as a low-probability gain and thus will tend toward risk
92. Guthrie, supra note 58, at 167-68.
93. Id. at 168.
94. Id. at 177-78.
95. Id.
96. See id at 185-87. Guthrie defines a frivolous claim as one "in which the
plaintiff has a low probability of prevailing at trial." Id. at 186. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct state that an action "is not frivolous even though the lawyer
believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2001) [hereinafter MRPC]. Rather, an action is frivolous if it
is undertaken
primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if
the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of
the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
Id. Thus, Guthrie's operationalized definition of frivolous claims is broader than the
ethical standard. It is not necessary to resolve this difference, however. Guthrie's
insight that the frames for plaintiffs and defendants may shift helps explain settlement
behavior and gives lawyers a helpful and realistic tool to examine their professional
behavior at every stage of litigation.
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taking.' Defendants, on the other hand, might see long-shot cases as
low-probability losses and, therefore, be inclined toward risk aversion.98
Guthrie's experiments support the hypothesis about the plaintiffs'
and defendants' initial frames." Risk-seeking plaintiffs created a
"psychological leverage" that gave them power in at least one important
dimension during settlement negotiations: a higher risk tolerance than
the opponent."° Plaintiffs used this power by demanding more than the
potential value of their case, while risk-averse defendants responded by
offering more than they believed the case was worth. This process
creates a settlement or drives up the final settlement amount. 0'
Guthrie's insights into plaintiffs' risk-seeking behavior may not be
limited to frivolous litigation. He does not confine his definition of
frivolous litigation to actions that would violate the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Thus, many plaintiffs might be initially risk-seeking
because plaintiffs will frame their situation as a loss. They have already
suffered some "damage." Unless they file a lawsuit, they face the
certainty of never recovering anything for that loss. Plaintiffs will not
have the legal expertise to accurately evaluate a case. They may see a
lawyer and decide to file a lawsuit because they believe that they have
"nothing to lose" by filing a suit. Filing a lawsuit is like rolling dice.
Unless gamblers roll the dice, they have no chance to gain anything.
At the same time, the nature of the legal system may encourage risk
seeking plaintiffs in the first place. Plaintiffs must go through a
complicated and difficult psychological and social process even to seek
legal advice.' It is possible that this process weeds out many risk-
97. Guthrie, supra note 58, at 187. They may approach a lawyer in a moderate-to-
high probability loss frame. That is, the plaintiffs have already suffered some definite
loss that caused them to seek legal advice. This frame should also induce risk-seeking
behavior. Thus, the plaintiff may have two risk factors working at the beginning of a
case. Id.
98. Id. at 187-88. As with plaintiffs, defendants may have two factors tending them
toward risk aversion at the outset of litigation. In contrast to the plaintiff, the defendant
may see the situation that may result in a lawsuit in a moderate-to-high probability gain
frame. That is, the defendant's actions may have resulted in some gain already.
Presumably, whatever the defendant did that the plaintiff objected to must have been
advantageous to the defendant in the first place. Thus, if the defendants perceive the
situation in this way they will likely be risk-averse even before a lawsuit is filed so as
to consolidate their gain. Id.
99. See id. at 189-91.
100. Id. at 191.
101. Id. at 192.
102. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and Claiming..., 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
631,633-37 (1980-81) (outlining how litigants must first perceive that they have been
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averse plaintiffs. They may become frustrated by the arduous process of
finding a lawyer and deciding to sue. They may also believe that they
will experience more losses in time, status, or money if they file a
lawsuit. These plaintiffs may abandon any idea of a lawsuit. Thus, many
plaintiffs may initially be risk-seeking because they may have framed
the case as a loss and therefore be more willing to go through the
difficult process of finding and consulting a lawyer.
Nevertheless, most lawsuits settle and most plaintiffs are perceived
as risk-averse as trial approaches. Even risk-seeking plaintiffs in long
litigation have to put aside risk-seeking behavior long enough to accept
the defendant's settlement offer. Two factors may cause these formerly
risk-seeking plaintiffs to become risk-averse. First, the parties may
change their frames about lawsuits by "endowing" the status quo so that
previously risk-seeking plaintiffs become risk-averse. Second, lawyers
may influence settlement patterns either by de-biasing litigants or
offering alternative ways of analyzing the settlement options.
With the passage of time, the plaintiff may come to feel entitled to
the initial offer (either the amount asked for in the lawsuit or the first
settlement offer). This belief "endows" the initial offer with value to the
plaintiff. When this happens, the plaintiff shifts to a gain frame,
encouraging settlement. Rachlinski points out that
[t]he sheer duration of litigation virtually ensures that the parties will
have an opportunity to view the costs and benefits of litigation
differently over time. [During the course of the lawsuit] plaintiffs
[must] have "endowed" the loss that gave rise to the suit that they
have commenced .. . .By filing suit, the plaintiff attempts to
reallocate a loss to the defendant, and hence the plaintiff might be
making choices in the domain of losses. Over time, however, the loss
becomes part of the plaintiff's "endowment"; it becomes the status
harmed, then decide that someone else is responsible for their harm, and then seek a
remedy from the wrongdoer, and describing the process as "subjective, unstable,
reactive, complicated, and incomplete"); Marilynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who
Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 105,
105-06 (1990) (describing how litigants maneuver through the "thickets of diversion"
to file medical malpractice lawsuits); Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships:
Understanding the Litigation Choices of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
67, 70-71 (1999) (showing how women who consider filing sexual harassment lawsuits
take into account the risk to their maternal, marital, and familial relationships); Rosalie
R. Young, The Searchfor Counsel: Perceptions ofApplicantsforSubsidizedLegalAssistance,
36 BRANDEIs J. FAM. L. 551, 571 (1997) (observing that because of institutional,
professional, and social obstacles, subjects brought lawsuits only when there seemed
to be no other way to solve their problem).
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quo. Upon filing the suit, the plaintiff is attempting to gain relative to
her status quo. Thus, .... the plaintiff has recast a loss as a gain.'
0 3
This endowment process explains how plaintiffs re-frame the case and
thereby become risk-averse. At the same time, however, defendants may
be re-framing the case to become more risk-seeking. Defendants begin
in a gains frame. That is, when lawsuits are filed, the defendants have
lost nothing. As the lawsuit advances, the defendants' losses in time and
money mount. When these losses become seen as the status quo,
defendants shift to a risk-seeking mode. They now may be willing to go
to trial because they believe they have nothing to lose.
Because the parties are going in opposite framing directions,
settlements should still be difficult to achieve unless some other factor
causes the parties to accept a final re-framing.'4 Prospect theory cannot
explain how parties who have framed the case in opposite ways can
reconcile their perspectives and achieve settlement. The parties have to
overcome the pull of their frames to evaluate the case in a different way.
Lawyers may allow clients to do this."S If a lawyer can help the client
re-frame the case, then cases should settle if lawyers get defendants to
adopt risk-averse frames. If lawyers help the client evaluate the case
outside of the client's natural frame, then cases should settle whenever
the benefits of settlement outweigh the costs of going to trial.
103. Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 147.
104. It may be that settlement happens because both plaintiff and defendant
"endow" the status quo. Even though the parties may be operating in different frames,
they both may have invested enough into the status quo to endow it with value. If so,
the status quo bias may push both parties to preserve the status quo and cement the
value with which each has endowed the status quo. This might be enough to push them
toward mutual agreement and out of contrary risk frames. See Birke & Fox, supra note
9, at 1 (discussing status quo bias and other psychological factors and ways to remedy
their harmful effects); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1109-10 (discussing
endowment effect and its implications for property rights).
105. Chris Guthrie suggests that the preference for settlement is created by the
desire of the parties to avoid regret. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret
Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 64. Guthrie argues that
both rational choice and framing theories cannot account for the high rates of
settlement and ignore the role of emotion. Id. at 45. He proposes the "regret aversion
theory of litigation." Id. Litigants who reject an offer and go to trial learn the outcome
of both courses of conduct while litigants who settle do not learn what would have
happened at trial. Id. at 72. Thus, settlement "offers litigants an opportunity to avoid,
or at least minimize, regret, while trial increases the likelihood litigants will experience
regret" and, therefore, some litigants should prefer settlement over trial. Id at 72-73.
Even in this scenario lawyers can play an important role by recognizing regret-adverse
clients and situations and counseling the client accordingly. Id. at 81-88.
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There is evidence that lawyers do both of these things. The effects
of framing may be mitigated for lawyers as a group because of the way
lawyers are trained to analyze and solve problems. Lawyers may
encourage clients to evaluate options on the basis of clients' costs and
benefits. In addition, defense lawyers may be more risk-averse as a
group. Thus, they may ameliorate defendants' natural risk-seeking in
settlement.
VII. How LAWYERS ENCOURAGE SETTLEMENT
BY MITIGATING THE FRAMING EFFECT
Lawyers may be pushing cases toward settlement by mitigating the
risk-seeking behavior of the parties. As Jeffrey Rachlinski notes:
Attorneys may mitigate the costly consequence of framing by
reconstructing the litigation for the client. Despite motive, opportu-
nity, and assistance, refraining may be difficult and a litigant may
spend a great deal of time and money before being able to see the case
from a different perspective. But it is certainly possible that passive
intermediaries, such as time, and active intermediaries, such as
attorneys, can recast litigation in the most sensible light for the
litigants, thereby mitigating framing's influence."
Lawyers overstate the level of risk, are prone toward a cost/benefit
analytical style, and are actors in a system that encourages efficient case
processing. These forces serve as a counterweight to a client's risk-
seeking behavior. This may encourage risk-seeking plaintiffs to endow
the status quo and tend toward risk-aversion. It may offer risk-seeking
defendants a reality check when they want to "roll the dice" at trial. And
it may subtly coerce criminal defendants into plea bargains when they
should take the risk of trial.
One way that lawyers encourage risk-averse behavior and therefore
settlement is to overstate the level of risk. Although this is difficult to
document empirically, conventional wisdom holds that lawyers
frequently overstate the risk. 7 Overstating risk may be a way for
lawyers to make more money. The more investigation the case needs,
106. Rachlinksi, supra note 2, at 147-48; see also Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, supra note
102, at 639-49 (showing how people and institutions are the vehicles by which a person
transforms a harmful event into a grievance); Morgan, supra note 102, at 70-72
(showing how women sought advice from family and friends in making litigation
decision).
107. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 64, at 375-76.
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the more hours a lawyer can bill.' Psychological dynamics may also
powerfully influence a lawyer's perception of the risk. l°9 Lawyers will
be tempted to take the safe course and estimate just enough risk for the
lawyer to manage."' Thus, overstating the risk may be a way to avoid
the chance of failure present in accurately stating the risk. In either case,
the lawyer's overstatement of the risk may counterbalance the risk-
seeking client's understatement of the risk.
Lawyers are faced with considerable uncertainty when initially
asked for advice. They must predict the future actions of people and
institutions that are subject to many intervening forces. Under these
circumstances, people tend toward "defensive pessimism": dwelling on
the potential negative consequences of the possible choices."'
Langevoort and Rasmussen state: "[Caution] is particularly likely when
the decision-maker faces a risk of loss. A transaction found unlawful
involves a distinct loss to the client (not to mention the lawyer). Second,
.. lawyers' norms are likely to generate a decision frame that prompts
a diligent search for risk."
'" 2
Thus, it is possible that by persistently overstating the level of risk,
lawyers mitigate the effect of risk-seeking clients. Whether this
overstatement comes about to increase a lawyer's income or because the
lawyer is excessively pessimistic, the result is the same: the excessively
optimistic risk-seeking client gets to see the case from a fundamentally
different perspective. This may mitigate the risk-seeking effects of a loss
frame on the client.
Lawyers may also mitigate framing effects because they are less
prone to them. In other words, lawyers may be different or see things
differently." 3 Law school myth holds that lawyers are taught to think in
108. Id. at 389-90 (showing how the per-hour fee arrangements create incentives
toward overstatement of risk).
109. Id. at 394-95. The lawyer may want to enhance his or his law firm's reputation
with this and other clients. Id. at 394. Leading a client astray into a risky venture can
cause great reputational damage. At the same time, clients are not in the position to
effectively evaluate a lawyer's advice. See id. If the lawyer counsels against a course
of action there is rarely a way to study the alternative course. On the other hand, if the
lawyers counsels action that changes the status quo, the client has a way to evaluate the
lawyer's advice. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 64, at 394. If the choice is
successful, then the advice was essentially self-fulfilling. But ifthe choice does not lead
to success, the client will immediately know that the lawyer's advice was faulty. Id. In
short, clients can only know the quality of the lawyer's advice after the fact. Id
110. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 64, at 394-95.
111. Id. at 424 (citing Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under
Ambiguity, 59 J. BUS. S225 (1986)); see also HOGARTH, supra note 23, at 101-09.
112. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 64, at 424-25.
113. See Fernando Colon-Navarro, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Expert-Novice Differences
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rigorous, objective, and analytical ways. Lawyers in fact do use a
rational or objective approach more consistently than their clients do.I 4
As Guthrie and Korobkin point out, lawyers were less likely than clients
to be influenced by psychological factors."' Lawyers may be more
likely to approach settlement using an objective cost/benefit calculus.
That is, they are more likely to evaluate settlement decisions on the
basis of the expected value of the various options without regard to the
frame in which those options are presented."6
These authors suggest that this different analytical orientation
begins early and is reinforced in law school and in law practice. Thus,
[t]o gain admission to law school, an applicant must demonstrate a
higher-than-average ability to think analytically. Once in law school,
legal training reinforces analytical problem-solving. By persistently
emphasizing the careful reading of appellate cases, legal training
teaches lawyers to analyze legal conflicts carefully and unemotionally
rather than to react to them viscerally. Once on the job, this analytical
training serves as a lens through which lawyers view and evaluate
their experiences."7
Personal factors may also play a role. Lawyers as a group may be
made up of people who are more inclined toward a "'hard" approach to
problems rather than a "soft" approach. Considerable data over the years
has highlighted some of the cognitive differences between lawyers and
the rest of the population." 8 Professor Susan Daicoff has collected all of
this data and concludes that lawyers do tend toward a more analytical,
objective, and impersonal approach than other people."'
in Simulated Client Interviews, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 107, 127-33 (1997) (concluding that
experience leads to more effective interviewing techniques).
114. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 82.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 121-22.
117. Id. at 87; see also Colon-Navarro, supra note 113, at 120 (noting that clinical
students are better able to assimilate interviewing model than inexperienced students).
118. See, e.g., Don Peters, Forever Jung: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator and Learning Negotiation, 42 DRAKE L. REv. 1 (1993).
119. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself. A Review ofEmpirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997); see also Susan
Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of
Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically Derived Attorney
Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 547 (1998). There is some disagreement
as to whether or not these differences are gender related. Compare RAND JACK & DANA
CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF
WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989), with Bryna Bogoch, Gendered Lawyering: Difference
and Dominance in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 677 (1997).
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Lawyers may be more objective than their clients and therefore they
may mitigate the risk-seeking behavior of some clients. This would lead
cases toward settlement because this objectivity counteracts the effect
that loss frames have on clients. A lawyer's objective analysis of
settlement options is more likely to point in a risk-averse direction and,
thus, lead risk-seeking clients to see the case in a more neutral frame.
In any event, it appears that lawyers may mitigate framing's effects
on risk-seeking clients by creating a climate of risk aversion. Whether
this happens because of lawyers' inherent risk aversion or a lawyer's
complicity in a powerful system, the effect is to push cases toward
settlement when prospect theory would suggest that cases should go to
trial. Whether this is a good thing depends on whether lawyers can more
consciously use prospect theory's insights when counseling their clients.
To the extent that lawyers become aware of the power of loss and gain
frames, lawyers should be able to better advise their clients. To the
extent that lawyers remain unaware of prospect theory's insights, any
improvement in lawyer-client decision making will be random. The next
section sets out a few suggestions for improving client counseling.
VIII. USING PROSPECT THEORY TO BECOME BETTER LEGAL COUNSELORS
Improvements in legal counseling techniques should proceed from
a realistic view of general human psychology and the unique psycholog-
ical dynamics of law practice.'2 Because most choices can be framed in
both a gain and a loss frame, the lawyer can avoid the most damaging
effects of framing by offering alternative ways of viewing choices.
Rachlinski notes that
an attorney may have some power to reframe a settlement offer,
sparing the client the most costly aspects of framing.., by pointing
out the losses that the defendant is sure to face from continued
litigation or by pointing out that a settlement offer is an improvement
over previous offers. The attorney is in a position to wrestle the
defendant out of the loss frame that would lead the defendant to make
risk-seeking choices. The principle benefit that framing theory
presents for attorneys lies in the attorney's perspective on the client's
choices. Framing asserts, after all, that clients are in a bad position to
make decisions in their best interest. To the extent that an attorney is
120. Birke & Fox, supra note 9, at 1 (stating that awareness of psychological
principles will make lawyers better negotiators); Guthrie, supra note 58, at 209;
Langevoort, supra note 18, at 78 (stating that social science suggests that lawyer norms,
like loyalty, may compromise otherwise ethical behavior).
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concerned with promoting the client's best interest, framing theory
gives them a significant role.' 2'
First, lawyers may be in a unique position to help clients reframe
litigation choices because lawyers may be more likely to evaluate
decisions using a rational choice or financial value framework. 22 This
offsets the tendency of clients to be influenced by loss or gain frames.
Moreover, a lawyer's overstatement of the risk may counterbalance the
unreasonable optimism to which some clients may fall prey.
23
Thus, lawyers may be able to mitigate the influence of "irrational"
psychological factors in a client's decision if they take an active role in
litigation decisions. 24 Guthrie and Korobkin studied the effect to which
information from a lawyer could influence a client toward settlement.
They looked at four different ways that an attorney might provide
information about a settlement offer. 25 Although their results are not
absolutely conclusive, they generally support the intuition that lawyers
have considerable influence on whether clients settle cases. 126 Clients
121. Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 171-72; see also Birke & Fox, supra note 9, at 46-47
(suggesting that negotiators use an objective system to add up value "across all issues"
and thus avoid measuring gains and losses relative to an artificial reference point).
122. Korobkin & Gurthrie, supra note 9, at 82.
123. See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 64, at 422-25 (listing the possible
factors that might encourage underestimation of the risk); Richard W. Painter, Lawyers'
Rules, Auditors'Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 Mn. L. REv. 1399, 1419-20
(2000).
124. Korobkin & Gurthrie, supra note 9, at 120. They noted:
[A]t least in some circumstances, lawyers taking an active role in their
client's litigation decisionmaking processes probably can affect the extent to
which psychological factors, as opposed to the comparison of the expected
financial values of alternative litigation options, motivate litigants' ultimate
decisions.
Id.
125. Id. They divided the experiments into two categories. Two groups were given
a scenario involving a car accident meant to test the effects of framing. The second
group was given a scenario involving a broken promise by their landlord meant to test
the effects of equity seeking. In the lawyer-influence experiments, they subdivided
these two groups into two more categories. They termed the first the "Lawyer as
Educator" and included: (1) "The Psychology Lesson," where lawyer-subjects provided
clients with information about how cognitive psychology affects decisionmaking; and
(2) "Consider the Opposite," where lawyer-subjects askedclients to look at the problem
from the opposite perspective. They called the second category "The Lawyer as
Decisionmaker" and included: (1) "Lawyer Recommendation with Explanation," where
the lawyer advised the client to accept the settlement offer with an explanation of the
financial value of doing so; and (2) "Lawyer Recommendation Without Explanation,"
where the lawyer advised the client to accept the settlement offer but provided no
explanation. Id. at 115-18.
126. Id. All four of the groups had increased rates of settlement. Id. at 119. The
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who were given an alternative frame for the decision by learning what
the lawyer would choose were more likely to change their minds than
other clients.2 Nevertheless, the study showed that not only are lawyers
less likely to be influenced by psychological dynamics, but also that
they can de-bias the decision process of some of their clients.' The
most interesting feature of these results shows the vitality of framing
effects over other psychological variables.'29
These findings call for a more balanced approach to legal counsel-
ing. First, this analysis makes a strict client-centered position difficult
to maintain. 3 Although there were interviewing texts available before
theirs,' Binder and Price's 1977 book on the subject quickly became
the standard for interviewing and counseling.' Their client-centered
approach instructed lawyers to refrain from interfering with client
choice as much as possible.' They argued that lawyers should almost
never give their opinion or advice to a client. I" Rather, the lawyer
increases were statistically significant for the landlord-tenant group, but not significant
for the car accident group. Id. at 119-20.
127. Id. at 121. Clients were more likely to have a more favorable attitude toward
settlement when the lawyer simply advised them of their choice without any
explanation, but the difference was not statistically significant. Id.
128. Id. But see Cross, supra note 56, at 25 (pointing out that preference for
settlement ignores the value that judicial precedent has for society); Owen M. Fiss,
Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (stating that pressure to
settle forces litigants without means to accept less than they are entitled to and robs
society of potentially far-reaching precedents).
129. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 121 ("Cognitive heuristics may be more
deeply ingrained in people's minds than socially-constructed desires such as the desire
to be treated fairly or to have the validity of one's position acknowledged.").
130. Id. at 126.
131. See, e.g., GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 124-272
(1978); HARROP FREEMAN & HENRY WEIHOFEN, CLINICAL LAW TRAINING (1972); MICHAEL
MELTSNER & PHILIP SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL
LEGAL EDUCATION 125-57 (1974); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (1976); ANDREW WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976). With one exception, these books also borrowed
heavily from the psychological literature. Bellow and Moulton diverge in that they
looked for models in the medical literature on doctor-patient counseling and titled one
oftheir sub-chapters Client Interviewing as Diagnosis. BELLOW& MOULTON, supra, at 140.
132. BINDER, BERGMAN, & PRICE, supra note 15; DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977). The
authors, now including Paul Bergman, made the connection to client-centered
psychotherapy more direct in their 1991 edition by renaming the work LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS.
133. Binder and Price, in their 1977 book, suggest that when a client is having
trouble making a decision, "providing the client with the option of choice... should
usually be a last resort." BINDER & PRICE, supra note 132, at 154.
134. Id. In their 1977 book, the authors said that "we believe the appropriate
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should serve as the conduit of the information which the client might
need to evaluate his or her options. Binder and Price conclude: "Because
client autonomy is of paramount importance, decisions should be made
on the basis of what choice is most likely to provide a client with
maximum satisfaction."'1
In their 1991 book, Binder, Bergman, and Price note that "unless
a client's decision violates the law or is clearly immoral, principles of
client autonomy suggest that client values prevail.', 36 Lawyers facilitate
this decision-making by providing clients with a complete list of options
and sufficient information on the pros and cons of each option.
According to those authors,
counseling is the process by which lawyers help clients decide what
course of action to adopt in order to resolve a problem. The process
begins with identifying a problem and clarifying a client's objectives.
Thereafter, the process entails identifying and evaluating the probable
positive and negative consequences of potential solutions in order to
decide which alternative is most likely to achieve the client's aims. '3
response to the client's request for the lawyer's opinion should be an explanation of
why the client should decide." Id. at 187. When asked for their opinion, they noted that
lawyers should "refrain from stating what they would do." Id. at 186. The only
exception was where the lawyer had a "fairly good sense of the client's value system"
because of "the lawyer's past dealings with the client." Id. Even when the client will
make an "extremely detrimental decision" the lawyer should not intervene "unless the
client's mental state will justify the appointment of a general representative." Id at 203,
205. The authors altered this approach slightly in their 1991 edition of the book,
sharpening the line between advice about consequences and advice about ultimate
decisions. BINDER, BERGMAN, & PRICE, supra note 15, at 259-60. Here they argue that
lawyers can give advice when requested so long as the advice is framed by reference
to the client's values. Id. at 348-49. They also give lawyers more leeway to suggest
alternatives in situations where the client is incapable or unwilling to make choices or
the client makes a bad decision. Id. at 350-61.
135. BINDER, BERGMAN, & PRICE, supra note 15, at 261. Defining "maximum
satisfaction" presents a problem not unlike defining what is a "rational" choice. See
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1060-67 (showing that definitions of rationality
range from accepting whatever choice a person makes as rational to denoting only
wealth-maximizing choices as rational). To a certain extent, client-centered advocates
substitute autonomy for rationality. That is, they deem the client satisfied if the client
makes the decision, no matter what the consequences of that decision may be. In other
words, it must be a good decision because the client made it.
136. BINDER, BERGMAN, & PRICE, supra note 15, at 282. But see THOMAS L. SHAFFER
& ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY 47-48 (1994)
(encouraging lawyers to collaborate with clients in making moral decisions because
lawyer and client should be "mutually concerned that both ofthem be and become good
persons"); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL 246-47 (3d ed. 1997) (suggesting that the choice of
counseling is always "shared choice" between client and lawyer).
137. BINDER, BERGMAN, & PRICE, supra note 15, at 259-60 (modifying the authors'
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In this view, lawyers are largely conduits of information. They
serve their clients well when they allow them to make fully informed
and rational decisions. They serve their clients poorly when they usurp
their clients' autonomy. Thus,
[a lawyer] cannot determine what decision is likely to lead to
maximum client satisfaction through reference to an external
standard. A rational choice can be made only by forecasting the likely
economic, social, psychological and moral ramifications of a decision
and determining their relative importance. While [a lawyer] may help
a client identify a decision's likely ramifications only a client can
determine their relative importance."'
This pure client-centered approach cannot be maintained. Clients expect
substantive as well as procedural advice.'39 In fact, legal competence and
personal rapport are equally important elements in client satisfaction. 4 '
The most satisfied clients were the ones who perceived their lawyers as
both socially and legally competent. 4 In other words, clients expect
lawyers to provide their legal and institutional expertise. They do not
expect their lawyers to remain passive when it comes to substantive and
procedural advice.
Second, lawyers have an ethical and a moral responsibility to help
clients reach decisions that are in the clients' best interest. 42 It would be
definition from their earlier work).
138. Id. at 263. The critics of client-centered counseling use the same assumptions.
Indeed, the most prominent criticism is that Binder, Bergman, and Price are not client-
centered enough or should be client-centered in a better way. Stephen Ellman wants to
put more client into it. Stephen Ellman, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717
(1987). He argues that client-centered counseling is fundamentally manipulative. Id. at
743 (stating that client-centered counseling allows the attorney to unilaterally and
manipulatively impose the goal of full participation). Robert Dinerstein concludes that,
on balance, the arguments in favor of client-centered lawyering outweigh those against
it. See generally Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 AiZ. L. REv. 501 (1990). The net effect of these criticisms suggests that
clients need more autonomy, which is another way of saying that they will make
rational choices if lawyers stay out of their way.
139. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 126 ("A client generally presumes her
lawyer will provide substantive advice, rather than just procedural assistance.").
140. See Stephen Feldman & Kent Wilson, The Value of Interpersonal Skills in
Lawyering, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 311, 317, 320 (1981). The authors found that high
competence and high relational skills were positively correlated to highest level of
client satisfaction. Id. at 320.
141. Id.; see COCHRAN, DIPIPPA, & PETERS, supra note 7, at 58-60 (discussing this
study and its relation to effective legal interviewing).
142. There is a question of what "best interests" might mean. See Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 1, at 1060 (noting that without a single definition of rational choice theory
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an unusual ethical world where a lawyer would remain silent when a
client pursues a course of conduct that the lawyer knows is not in the
client's interest.'43 Client-centered counseling cautions against interven-
tion even in this scenario.
[C]lients are usually unable to communicate a precise description of
the weights which they place on the probable consequences and an
accurate sense of the degree to which they are "risk avoiders." In our
opinion, without access to this information, the lawyer usually cannot
determine what course of action would be best suited for the client.
We therefore conclude that usually the lawyer should leave the final
decision for the client to make on the basis of the client's own
intuitive weighing process.'"
Client-centered counseling uses client values as the decision
touchstone. Lawyers are to ensure that clients make decisions that are
consistent with their values. But because the lawyer may not be able to
accurately discern the clients values, client-centered advocates fear that
lawyer intervention and advice will steer clients to decisions that are
consistent with lawyer values and not client values." 5
That lawyers and clients often have conflicting interests suggests once
again that decisions ought to remain in [the] client's hands. Even if
you could determine a client's values and preferences, the temptation
to decide the matter in a way which advances your personal interests
is reason to allow [the] client to make the ultimate choice."
it is difficult to determine when a person has acted "rationally").
143. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 126.
144. BINDER& PRICE, supra note 132, at 150:
145. BINDER, BERGMAN, &PRICE, supra note 15, at 265 ("[E]ven ifyou could become
fully conversant with a client's value and preference structure, you perhaps ought not
be trusted to make important decisions because of potential conflicts of interest.").
146. Id. There is a difference between allowing the client to make "the ultimate
decision" and advising the client along the way. The Rules of Professional Conduct
dictate that lawyers must accept the ultimate decisions of clients. See MRPC, supra note
96, R. 1.2(a).
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation ... [and] whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.
In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury
trial and whether the client will testify.
Id (emphasis added). The issue is not whether lawyers should make these "ultimate
decisions" for their clients. They cannot. Rather, the issue is how lawyers conduct the
consultation that goes into a client's "ultimate decision." The Model Rules define
"consultation" as "communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the
client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question." Id. Model Rule 1.2(a)
requires consultation on the means used to pursue the client's objectives. Id. Model
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Interestingly, Binder and Price term the difference in lawyer and
client transactional risk assessment a "conflict of interest." Prospect
theory, however, shows that a client's relative preference for risk-
seeking may not be "rational" in those circumstances. A lawyer's risk
aversion in that situation is not a conflict of interest, it is sound
professional behavior. 47 As Professor Guthrie and Korobkin conclude:
The lawyer who shies away from making recommendations alto-
gether, or who makes them only when pressed, risks abetting client
mistakes; the lawyerwho makes recommendations without providing
sufficient explanation[,] risks persuading clients to abandon good
decisions, in the sense that they maximize client utility, for bad
ones.1
48
Lawyers should not adopt an authoritarian, lawyer-centered model
either. That model does not produce satisfied clients. 149 When lawyers
dominate their clients' it leads to poor representation.. and a break-
Rule 1.4(b) requires a lawyer to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. Id.
R.1.4(b). Thus, this author believes the rules seem to require a lawyer to provide
information about consequences, psychological dynamics, and decision processes. The
danger in the client-centered formulation is that it might make lawyers too passive in
situations where their input can help the client considerably.
147. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 2639. Sunstein states:
If people's choices are based on incorrect judgments about their experiences
after choice, there is reason to question whether respect for choices, rooted in
those incorrect judgments, is a good way to promote utility or welfare ....
[Q]bjections to paternalism should be empirical and pragmatic... ; such
objections should not be a priori in nature.
Id.
148. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 136; see also Sunstein, supra note 16, at
2639 (questioning how one can override another's preference in light of the on-going
psychological and social construction of individual preferences).
149. Feldman & Wilson, supra note 140, at 312-13; Sunstein, supra note 16, at2639
("Recent revisions in understanding human behavior . . . greatly unsettle certain
arguments against paternalism in law. They do not make an affirmative case for
paternalism, but they support a form of anti-antipaternalism.").
150. There is considerable literature on the ways that lawyers dominate their clients.
See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992); Carl J.
Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going to
Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBs. 599 (1979); Gary
Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of Interviewing and Counseling
Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 177 (1986); Austin
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers andLegal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce
Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989); see also COCHRAN, DIPPPA, & PETERS, supra
note 7, at 11-20 (discussing these studies in relation to legal interviewing and
counseling); Bryna Bogoch, Power, Distance, and Solidarity: Models ofProfessional Client
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down in communication between lawyer and client.'52 In addition,
psychological factors may influence how lawyers make decisions. They
may overstate risk in ways that are self-serving. They may make bad
choices that result in more loss to themselves and to their clients. And
they may be pressured by institutional factors to undermine even the
beneficient effects of framing.
For example, prospect theory cannot explain why so many criminal
defendants take plea bargains.' Criminal defendants confronted with
plea bargains are in loss frames in ways that are even more obvious than
defendants in civil cases. They must choose between certain adverse
consequences (a criminal record and possibly jail time) and the
possibility of even greater adverse consequences (conviction at trial on
more serious charges)." Nevertheless, over ninety percent of all
criminal cases are settled by plea bargains.'" Professor Birke believes
that bad advice is the only plausible explanation for this phenomena.'56
Defense attorneys may get pleas from their clients either by giving too
little information about the value of a trial or by framing offers in ways
that cause defendants to perceive more value in them than actually
exists. Institutional pressures may influence attorneys to perceive
Interaction in an Israeli Legal Aid Setting, 5 DISCOURSE & Soc'Y 65 (1994).
151. See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 41-61
(1974) (showing that clients who participated actively in their personal injury cases
received better settlements than clients who did not participate). Compare Hosticka,
supra note 150, at 607 (stating that by controlling the conversation, lawyers channel
cases into familiar areas, potentially missing other significant issues) with Neustadter,
supra note 150, at 207 (noting that bankruptcy lawyer who specialized in one form
rarely raised other form with clients).
152. See Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 150, at 1497 (documenting how clients
asserted power over domineering lawyers by changing their minds, putting off
decisions, withholding information, or simply walking away from the representation).
153. Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REv.
205.
154. Id. at 219. According to Birke:
Defendants who plead guilty are waiving gambles (possible acquittal at trial)
and accepting known punishments (the plea bargain). Loss-averse criminal
defendants should refuse to accept the certain loss of liberty or property that
accompanies a plea bargain in order to avail themselves of the opportunity
to go to trial, and be in a state of zero-loss, even where the expected value
of trial is somewhat less than the value of a plea.
Id.
155. Id. at207.
156. Id. at 247 (stating that defendants take pleas because "they are misinformed
about the values of trials and pleas, and because please are framed as gains").
157. Id. For example, defense attorneys may not be able or willing to give the client
a complete analysis of the comparative values of trial and plea. Yet the lawyer is in the
best position to make this analysis because the lawyer is a "repeat-player" in the
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trials in a personal loss frame. 58 This is consistent with other findings
that show that criminal defense lawyers value their role as insiders in the
system. Trials make the system inefficient and criminal defense
lawyers--especially high-volume lawyers-who insist on trial will
make the system inefficient and, therefore they will lose face. 59 He
concludes:
Defendants plead because they are misinformed about the values of
trials and pleas, and because pleas are framed as gains. Defendants
are manipulated into pleading because they possess too little informa-
tion to overcome framing effects inherent in the valuation of pleas
and trials, and because they lack information to accurately value that
which they so readily trade away-the right to trial. Naturally,
defense attorneys respond to incentives of the court that encourage
pleas, and these responses manifest themselves as information that
distorts defendants' views of their alternatives. Trial looks worse than
it really is, and so the plea looks relatively better.' 6
To Birke, these findings show that the "fundamental problem in the
criminal plea bargaining process is with the way that defendants get
information."' 6 Additional information would fix the "information
channel," but the problem is that neither the client nor the lawyer have
all of the necessary information.6 6 Thus, Birke recommends that the
system. At the same time, the lawyer is an institutional player by virtue of this
experience. Thus, the lawyer may give truncated information or information that
portrays the plea as a gain. Id. at 243, 247.
158. Id. at 241-42. Attorneys have economic and reputational pressures. The public
defender is paid by the state and must maximize her time while the private attorney is
usually paid up front and must conserve the retainer. Id. at 239. In addition, attorneys
who do not appear to cooperate in the systems efficiencies may be punished in subtle
ways. Id. at 241-42.
159. See Birke, supra note 153, at 239; Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing
Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness ofDeterminate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61,
78 (1993).
160. Birke, supra note 153, at 247. This outcome may be exacerbated by defense
counsels' tendency to use a strict lawyer-centered approach to legal counseling. See
Rodney Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense
Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study ofAttorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47
KANS. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998).
161. Birke, supra notel53, at 248.
162. Id. at 248-49; see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1106-07 (stating that
because of the manipulability of frames, legal reform might involve the presentation
of additional information from the government framed to encourage the socially
desirable result). Butsee Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 16, at 1533-34 (noting that
behavioral economics suggests that simply providing additional information may not
produce the desired outcome because there is often no neutral way to present
information and thus additional information may simply paralyze the decision maker).
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information come from the system ofjustice itself, either in the form of
"more thorough colloquies between defendants and judges, or in the
creation of a class of neutral individuals whose job is to advise
defendants about the value of their case and to talk generally about the
trial process... [or collect and transmit] trial data to accused defen-
dants.
163
Simply transmitting this information to the defendant with the
instruction to "think about it" would not be sufficient. The defendant
may still frame the information inappropriately or use other heuristics
to short circuit a fully "rational" decision. At the same time, overbearing
lawyers may dominate the process by telling the clients what to think
about the information. Lawyers who are aware of the psychological
dynamics of decision making can go a long way toward ameliorating the
problems of extreme client- or lawyer-centeredness. Both parties, client
and lawyer, must be fully engaged in the decisions of the case. There are
many dimensions to this participation, but frank recognition of the
psychological dynamics of decision making may be one of the most
important. Attorneys can minimize the effect of framing if they "can sit
down, face-to-face, and explain the psychological barrier to their
clients."'" Even then, overcoming psychological barriers will be
difficult, and there is still the chance that lawyers will unnecessarily
usurp the client's decision-making authority.1
65
Guthrie and Korobkin recommend that lawyers take a "cognitive
error" approach to counseling clients.'" When the lawyer and the client
evaluate decisions differently, the lawyer should try to discover the basis
for the difference. If the difference is the result of a client's cognitive
error that results in a decision that goes against both the client's
financial utility and his values, the lawyer should intervene. Korobkin
and Guthrie describe their cognitive error approach in this way:
We think it nearly self-evident that a lawyer who knows his client is
embarking on a course with a lower expected utility than an alterna-
tive course has an ethical obligation to take preventive action. On the
other hand, when the client's expressed litigation desires maximize
his expected utility, the lawyer should avoid any action that might
convince the client to abandon his position .... The cognitive error
approach to counseling, then, requires the lawyer to assess whether an
observed difference between the lawyer's and client's analysis of
163. Birke, supra note 153, at 249.
164. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 72, at 162-63.
165. Id. at 163.
166. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 83.
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decision options is due to the client's cognitive error or is merely the
manifestation of differences in utility functions. If the difference is
due to cognitive error, the lawyer should attempt to change the
client's outlook. If the difference is the result of different preference
structures, the lawyer should scrupulously avoid any interference." 7
This is not to say that lawyers must become psychologists. Rather,
the lawyer should "steer a middle course between indiscriminately
attempting to influence settlement decisions and indiscriminately
avoiding such a role."'68 Korobkin and Guthrie suggest that lawyers
"engage the client in an interactive counseling process" that may
eventually lead to the lawyer volunteering advice.'69 This advice should
always be "accompanied by an explicit description of the considerations
underlying the advice and an explanation of the considerations that
suggest that the client might not want to alter" the decision.'
IX. CONCLUSION
This essay has outlined the basic findings of prospect theory and its
implications for legal counseling. These findings suggest that lawyers
should take a less ideological, more pragmatic approach to studying and
teaching legal counseling. Neither lawyer nor client can take refuge
behind a perfectly rational or perfectly autonomous model in light of the
consistent "imperfections" in their cognition revealed by social science.
Rather, the lawyer must be aware of the flawed rational machinery used
by both her and the client and adjust her approach. Lawyers must find
a point somewhere between the two extremes of client-centered and
lawyer-centered counseling. This middle ground was aptly described
over twenty years ago by Irving Janis:
[This kind of counseling] involves the joint work of the counselor and
the client in diagnosing and improving the latter's decision making
efforts .... The counselor attempts to help the person resolve realistic
conflicts that arise when he or she is facing a difficult choice ....
Much of the counselor's work consists of making clients aware of the
decision-making procedures that they are using and of alternative
procedures that they are not using. The counselor may be somewhat
directive, however, in suggesting where to go for pertinent informa-
tion, how to take account of knowledge about alternative courses of
167. Id at 130.
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action, how to find out if deadlines need to be taken at face value or
can be negotiated, which risks might require preparing contingency
plans, and the like.'
171. Janis, supra note 7, at 6-7.
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